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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County. Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on March 20,
2007 this Court entered an Order granting the Molers' Petition for Permission to Appeal
an Interlocutory Order (R. 1770). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0).

in

ISSUES ON APPEAL
(1)

Whether the trial court erred by failing to conclude that Ms. Moler-Lewis is

a "representative" of her parents under Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(4) whose
communications with her parents and their counsel are therefore protected by the
attorney-client privilege; and
(2)

If Ms. Moler-Lewis is a "representative" for purposes of Rule 504(a)(4),

whether the trial court erred by holding that the Molers waived the privilege by testifying
about conversations predating their appointment of Ms. Moler-Lewis as their
representative.
The Molers preserved these issues below by: (a) refusing to allow Mr. Moler to
testify about conversations with his daughter relating to the litigation after the
commencement of litigation (See R. 1178-79 (deposition testimony of Dennis Moler));
and (b) by opposing Defendants' motion to compel documents and testimony reflecting
such conversations (See R. 1154-1206).
Under Utah law, "the existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court,"
and the trial court's ruling on the existence of a privilege is ""reviewfed] for correctness,
giving no deference to the trial court's determination." State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86,
88 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1997)).
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The trial court's finding that a privilege was waived is also a legal conclusion that is
reviewed, "for correctness." Doe v. Maret. 1999 UT 74, ^ 6, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1999).

v

DETERMINATIVE RULES
The following Rules of Evidence are determinative of this appeal, or are of central
importance to this appeal:
(1)

Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(1): A "client" is a person, including a public
officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either
public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer,
or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal
services.

(2)

Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(4): A "representative of the client" is one
having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice
rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically
authorized to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal matter.

(3)

Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(5): A "communication" includes advice
given by the lawyer in the course of representing the client and includes
disclosures of the client and the client's representatives to the lawyer or the
lawyer's representative incidental to the professional relationship.

(4)

Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(6): A communication is "confidential" if not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to
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the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communication.
(5)

Utah Rule of Evidence 504(b): General rule of privilege. A client has a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating
the rendition of professional legal services to the client between the client
and the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and
lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, and among the
client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers
representing others in matters of common interest, in any combination.

(6)

Utah Rule of Evidence 504(c): Who may claim the privilege. The privilege
may be claimed by the client, the client's guardian or conservator, the
personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or
similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization,
whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of
the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on
behalf of the client.

(7)

Utah Rule of Evidence 507(a): A person upon whom these rules confer a
privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or communication
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waives the privilege if the person or a predecessor while holder of the
privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any
significant part of the matter or communication, or fails to take reasonable
precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does not apply if the
disclosure is itself a privileged communication.

viii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In early 2002 the Defendants were actively marketing a new residential planned
unit development in Sandy, Utah, known as Redfeather Estates. A key component of
Defendants' marketing was the fact that residency in Redfeather was and always would
be limited to households where at least one person was 55 years of age or older. When
Defendants obtained plat approval from the Sandy City Planning Commission,
Defendants were instructed to include the age restriction within the Redfeather
Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions ("CC&Rs"). Accordingly, the age restriction was
stated and restated throughout the original Redfeather CC&Rs, and was mentioned
prominently in Redfeather advertising materials.
Dennis Moler spent more than thirty-five years as an agent in the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. In 2002, when his retirement was imminent, he and his wife Marilynn
began looking to build a home in a community consisting of homeowners fifty-five years
or older. In March 2002, the Molers became aware of Redfeather Estates and contacted
McCandless to discuss the possible purchase of a residence. During this initial
conversation—and in every conversation that occurred thereafter—McCandless
represented to the Molers that Redfeather Estates was solely for individuals over fiftyfive years of age. The Molers and McCandless then met on numerous occasions to
discuss this possible purchase. During those conversations, McCandless stated that
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Redfeather Estates would be the first gated community in Sandy for individuals over
fifty-five years of age, and showed the Molers how the residences were being constructed
for mature adults. The Molers were sold. This was the home—and the community—in
which they expected to spend the rest of their lives.
On April 23, 2002, the Molers and Franklin Homes1 executed a Real Estate
Purchase Contract (the "Contract") for construction of a home in Redfeather Estates. The
Contract called for the Molers to pay $215,900.00 for a residence to be constructed at
Redfeather Estates. The Molers provided a $ 1,000 earnest money deposit on that date in
accordance with the terms of the Contract. During that meeting McCandless repeatedly
mentioned the 55 and over restriction, and he read through the Original CC&Rs with the
Molers. The Contract expressly incorporated several other documents, including the
Original CC&Rs that expressly limited Redfeather Estate ownership to individuals over
fifty-five years of age. The Contract established October 30, 2002 as the "Substantial
Completion Deadline." Closing was scheduled for two days after the Molers received
notice that construction was substantially complete. On May 22, 2002, the Molers met
with Defendants, discussed various aspects of construction, and provided Franklin Homes

Franklin Homes and its principal Quinn Heder, as well as Sunrise Capital, were named
defendants in this action at the time the order at issue was entered by the trial court, but
both have since been dismissed as a result of a settlement.
x

with a check for $20,590 as required by the Contract. At no time during this meeting did
any Defendant indicate that the fifty-five and over age restriction would be removed.
Yet unbeknownst to the Molers, at that very moment Defendants were engaging in
unilateral efforts to change Redfeather Estates' very nature. Persons under the age of 55
were expressing interest in Redfeather, and Defendants were growing increasingly
desperate to sell homes. Thus, as early as April 16, 2002, the Defendants were discussing
in their weekly project meetings the idea of lifting the age restriction to speed up sales.
By May 14, 2002—a week before the Molers made their $20,000 payment to Defendants
as scheduled—Defendants were already planning to petition Sandy City to remove the
age restriction. None of the Defendants ever told the Molers that Defendants were taking
steps to remove the age restriction—the very thing that brought the Molers to Redfeather
in the first place.
Despite their failure to notify the Molers of their intent to remove the age
restriction, on June 20, 2002, McCandless met with the Sandy City Planning Commission
to obtain approval to remove Redfeather Estates' fifty-five year or older age restriction.
McCandless advised the Planning Commission that he had several potential buyers who
are not yet 55 years of age but desire to live in the project, and under the current project
approval and CC&Rs he was prohibited from selling to these individuals. The Planning
Commission agreed to McCandless' request subject to the approval of Redfeather
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owners. No such approval was ever sought, let alone obtained, from the Molers or any
other homeowner.
After convincing Sandy City that the nature of Redfeather Estates needed to be
changed to increase sales, Defendants took the next step. On August 12, 2002,
Defendants executed and recorded "An Amendment to the Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions and Reservation of Easements for Redfeather Estates,
P.ILD." (the "First Amended CC&Rs"). The First Amended CC&Rs, among other
things, purported to remove from the Redfeather Estate CC&Rs "any and all references to
age restriction or minimum age." Unaware of this sea-change that had been made to their
community, on September 26, 2002, the Molers upheld their end of the bargain by
providing the remaining amounts due under the Contract and closed on the purchase of
their residence.
The Defendants never advised the Molers of the First Amended CC&Rs or that the
fifty-five and over age restriction had been removed. Instead, the Defendants took
affirmative steps to conceal what they had done. For example, in early 2005 Mr.
McCandless visited Redfeather and spoke with the Molers at their home. The Molers and
their daughter, Wendy Moler-Lewis, asked Mr. McCandless directly whether Redfeather
was still a 55 and over community. Twice Mr. McCandless unequivocally responded:
"yes." Because she was privy to these and other communications relevant to the Molers'
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allegations, Ms. Moler-Lewis is a fact witness in this lawsuit. Although Ms. MolerLewis graduated from law school and was at one time a practicing attorney, she has never
represented her parents in this action and has never purported to do so.
The Molers eventually learned the truth about what the Defendants had done.
After unsuccessful efforts to resolve their disputes with the Defendants without litigation,
the Molers decided to pursue legal action. Because they were unfamiliar with civil
litigation, they empowered Ms. Moler-Lewis to identify a law firm to assist them with
their dispute. After counsel was retained, Ms. Moler-Lewis remained actively involved
in the litigation and was privy to numerous communications between her parents and
their counsel. The Molers' Complaint, filed on February 13, 2006, alleged breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, fraudulent
concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of Utah's deceptive trade
practices statute.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Molers' complaint, and in the alternative for
summary judgment, but the trial court denied both motions. (R. 598-600.) Discovery
then proceeded, with all parties serving written discovery and taking depositions. During
Defendants' deposition of Dennis Moler, counsel for McCandless and CW Management
asked Mr. Moler to describe in detail all communications he has had with Ms. MolerLewis concerning this lawsuit, including those where counsel was present. Counsel for
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the Molers objected and instructed Mr. Moler not to answer. Defendants then moved to
compel communications between Ms. Moler-Lewis and her parents concerning the
litigation (R. 977-979A), and the Molers opposed the motion (R. 1154-1206). The court
heard oral argument and, a few days later, granted Defendants' motion to compel. (R.
1378-1381.) The Molers then petitioned this Court for leave to file an interlocutory
appeal, which petition was granted on March 22, 2007. (R. 1770-1770A.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Utah Rule of Evidence 504 extends the attorney-client privilege to representatives
of the client. In reliance upon the express language of Rule 504, the Molers appointed
their daughter, Wendy Moler-Lewis, as their representative in connection with this
litigation. In that capacity Ms. Moler-Lewis was authorized to, and did in fact, identify
legal counsel to represent her parents, and then participated actively in strategic decisions
concerning the litigation. Ms. Moler-Lewis was privy to communications between her
parents and their counsel, received and reviewed drafts of pleadings, and discussed the
lawsuit with her parents. At all times the Molers, their counsel, and Ms. Moler-Lewis
were operating under the assumption—grounded in the express language of Rule 504—
that these communications were privileged as Ms. Moler-Lewis was acting as her
parents' representative.
Hence, when counsel for the Defendants in this action asked Mr. Moler questions
in his deposition about conversations he had with his daughter about the lawsuit, counsel
for the Molers objected and instructed Mr. Moler not to answer. Defendants then moved
to compel the production of documents and testimony reflecting communications
between the Molers and their daughter, including communications to which the Molers'
counsel were parties, after Ms. Moler-Lewis was appointed as her parents' representative.
The Molers opposed Defendants' motion primarily on the ground that the
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communications were privileged under Rule 504 because Ms. Moler-Lewis was a dulyappointed litigation representative of her parents. The trial court granted the motion to
compel, but never addressed whether Ms. Moler-Lewis was a "representative" as
expressly provided for under Rule 504. The trial court instead concluded (1) that Ms.
Moler-Lewis was not an "agent" of her parents because her services were not necessary
for the provision of legal services, and (2) even if Ms. Moler-Lewis was an agent, the
Molers waived any privilege when Mr. Moler was allowed to testify about conversations
with his daughter that predated the commencement of litigation and the hiring of counsel.
The trial court's rulings are legally incorrect for two reasons. First, Rule 504
speaks only in terms of representatives—not agents—and nowhere requires that the
representative's services be absolutely necessary for the provision of legal services.
Second, the Molers could not have waived any privilege by testifying about
conversations occurring before litigation commenced, because until litigation
commenced or was imminent and counsel was retained, no attorney-client privilege
existed under Rule 504. Thus, the Molers could not have refused to testify regarding the
communications with their daughter that predated the hiring of counsel, or their
appointment of her as their litigation representative.
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Because the trial court's order requires the Molers to disclose communications that
are privileged under the express terms of Rule 504, the trial court's rulings are in error
and should be reversed.

xvn

FACTUAL STATEMENT
A.

Dennis & Marilynn Moler
L

Dennis and Marilyn Moler (the "Molers"), the plaintiffs in this case, had

never been involved in civil litigation before this lawsuit. See R. 1169 (Affidavit of
Dennis Moler ("Moler Aff.")) 14.
2.

The Molers have three daughters, one of whom is Wendy Moler-Lewis. IcL

(R. 1169)13.
B.

Wendy Moler-Lewis

3.

Wendy Moler-Lewis received her juris doctorate degree from Creighton

University Law School in 1999. See R. 1173 (Affidavit of Wendy Moler-Lewis ("Lewis
Aff.")) 14.
4.

Shortly thereafter, Ms. Moler-Lewis became a member of the Utah Bar and

joined VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy ("Van Cott") for approximately three
years as a litigation associate. Ms. Moler-Lewis left VanCott several years ago to help
run her husband's dental practice. Id. (R. 1173) ^ 5.
5.

While employed at Van Cott, Ms. Moler-Lewis worked and became

friendly with Evan S. Strassberg, who was also a litigation associate at the time. Mr.
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Strassberg and Ms. Moler-Lewis have maintained a personal friendship since that time.
IA(R. 1173)f 6.
6.

In the 2002-2005 time period, because the Molers watched Ms. Moler-

Lewis' daughter, Ms. Moler-Lewis was frequently at the Molers' residence and was well
aware of their various efforts to deal with Defendants' fraud and other wrongful acts. Id
(R. 1173)f 7.
C-

Ms. Moler-Lewis is a Representative of her Parents in this Litigation,
7.

In December 2005, as it became clear that litigation was inevitable, Ms.

Moler-Lewis—at her parents' express request and authorization—helped her parents look
for and select counsel to help the handle the litigation. Ms. Moler-Lewis telephoned at
least two Salt Lake attorneys on her parents' behalf. IcL (R. 1173) ^ 8; Moler Aff. (R.
1169)t5.
8.

During that same time period, Ms. Moler-Lewis received an announcement

from Mr. Strassberg stating that he and Mr. Ensor were forming a law partnership. Lewis
Aff. (R. 1174) If 9.
9.

Shortly thereafter, and based on her personal and professional relationship

with Mr. Strassberg, Ms. Moler-Lewis called Mr. Strassberg and briefly explained the
facts of her parents' case. Mr. Strassberg indicated he was interested in discussing the
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matter further, and Ms. Moler-Lewis set up an in-person meeting with Mr. Strassberg and
theMolers. IdL(R. 1174)f 10.
10.

The initial meeting between Mr. Strassberg and the Molers took place at the

Molers' home in Redfeather Estates, which Ms. Moler-Lewis also attended. Id (R. 1174)
if 11; Moler Aff.(R. 1169)f 7.
11.

At all relevant times, dating back to at least December 2005, Ms. Moler-

Lewis had the authority to obtain professional legal services, and to act on any advice
rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of her parents. Ms. Moler-Lewis has also been
specifically authorized to communicate with Strassberg & Ensor on this matter, and has
done so on numerous occasions. Moler Aff. (R. 1169) f 8; Lewis Aff. (R. 1174) ^j 12.
12.

Among other things, Ms. Moler-Lewis has spoken with her parents about

drafts of pleadings prepared by Strassberg & Ensor, and has discussed with them strategic
matters pertaining to the lawsuit. Moler Aff. (R. 1170) U 9; Lewis Aff. (R. 1174) f 13.
13.

Mr. Moler never intended to waive the attorney-client privilege by

communicating with Ms. Moler-Lewis about the lawsuit. Moler Aff. (R 1170) ^f 10.
D.

Ms. Moler-Lewis was a Client of Strassberg & Ensor, P.C.
14.

Ms. Moler-Lewis retained Strassberg & Ensor P.C. (now known as Young,

Hoffman, Strassberg & Ensor, LLP) to represent her in relation to this matter, in
particular in regard to her role as a witness and in response to Defendants' threats that a
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claim for defamation might be filed. Ms. Moler-Lewis' attorney-client relationship with
Strassberg & Ensor began in January 2006. Lewis Aff. (R. 1174) f 14.
E.

Dennis Moler's Deposition
15.

On October 10, 2006, Defendants deposed Dennis Moler. (R. 1177.)

16.

Defendants' counsel asked Mr. Moler several questions about

conversations with his daughter, Wendy Moler-Lewis, in regard to Ms. Moler-Lewis'
involvement with this litigation. (R. 1178-79.)
17.

Plaintiffs counsel objected to, and instructed Mr. Moler not to answer,

questions relating to Wendy Moler-Lewis' actions as the representative of her parents in
the current litigation. Id.
18.

Plaintiffs counsel's basis for the objection and instruction not to answer

was that Ms. Moler-Lewis was a representative of Mr. Moler in regard to Mr. Moler's
claims against Defendants and that Plaintiffs' counsel also represented Ms. Moler-Lewis
in relation to this matter. Id.
19.

Defendants' counsel asked, and received answers to, questions relating to

conversations between Mr. Moler and his other daughters in regard to the litigation
because these daughters were not acting as the Molers' representative in this matter.
(R. 1180.)

20.

Defendants' counsel also asked Mr. Moler several questions regarding his

conversations with Ms. Moler-Lewis during the 2005-2005 time period, i.e., prior to the
litigation. See, e.g., id.
2L

Plaintiffs' counsel did not object to questions relating to pre-litigation

conversations because during that time period there was no attorney-client relationship,
and those communications were not privileged.
F.

Defendants' Motion to Compel
22.

Defendants moved to compel the production of documents and further

deposition testimony disclosing communications between the Moiers and their daughter,
even when counsel for the Moiers was a party to the communications. (R. 977-79.)
23.

The Moiers opposed that motion on two primary grounds. First, the Moiers

argued that Wendy Moler-Lewis was, under the express terms of Utah Rule of Evidence
504, a "representative of the client" and therefore the Moiers had "a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing" communications to which she
was a party. (R. 1160-63.) Second, the Moiers pointed out that Ms. Moler-Lewis was a
client of Strassberg & Ensor, whose communications with the lawyers of that firm were
therefore privileged. (R. 1162.)
24.

On December 28, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting

Defendants' motion to compel (the "Order"). (R. 1379-80.) The trial court concluded
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that Ms. Moler-Lewis was not an "agent" of her parents, but never addressed whether she
was a "representative" as provided for under Rule 504. The trial court further ruled that,
even if there were a privilege between the Molers and their daughter, it was waived when
Mr. Moler testified in his deposition about conversations predating the commencement of
litigation. (R. 1380.)
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ARGUMENT
L

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 504 ALLOWS
MS. MOLER-LEWIS TO BE A "REPRESENTATIVE" OF HER PARENTS,
AND HER COMMUNICATIONS WITH COUNSEL AND THE MOLERS
WERE THEREFORE PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE.
The fundamental issue presented on this appeal is whether the attorney-client

privilege extends to communications that involve the client's designated representative—
in this case, the clients' daughter. The analysis of this issue begins with the plain
language of Utah Rule of Evidence 504, which sets forth this Court's articulation of the
attorney-client privilege.
Utah Rule of Evidence 504(b) states the general rule of privilege:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client between the client and client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common
interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers lawyer's
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common
interest, in any combination.
[Emphasis added.]
Rule of Evidence 504(a) states in unambiguous terms that the scope of the
privilege extends to persons who are deemed "representatives" of the client, and thus
makes it clear that conversations between the client and the Client's Representatives fall

within the scope of the privilege, as do conversations between the attorney and the
client's representative. The Rule defines a "representative of the client" as: "one having
authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant
thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the
lawyer concerning a legal matter." Id. Noticeably absent from this definition is any
requirement that the assistance of the representative be "necessary" to the representation,
or require that the representative be the equivalent of a legal "agent."
The Molers and their counsel relied upon the plain language of Rule 504 when the
Molers appointed Ms. Moler-Lewis as their representative, and shared with her privileged
communications regarding the Molers' representation. The Molers presented evidence to
the trial court establishing that Ms. Moler-Lewis had authority to, and did in fact, obtain
legal services for her parents, and was authorized to communicate with Strassberg &
Ensor concerning the Molers' lawsuit. (Moler Aff. (R. 1169)fflf5, 8; Moler-Lewis Aff.
(R. 1173-1174) 1flf 8, 12.) That evidence was unrebutted by Defendants. Indeed, the very
creation of the attorney-client relationship was the result of Ms. Moler-Lewis' authorized
actions on her parents' behalf. (Moler-Lewis Aff. (R. 1173) f 8 ("In approximately
December 2005, as it became clear that litigation was inevitable, my parents asked me to
help them identify and retain counsel to help handle the litigation.")

2

Ms. Moler-Lewis has also been involved in meetings and conversations between
counsel and the Molers, and she helped review pleadings before they were filed. (Id f
13.) She has on her own communicated with attorneys in connection with the lawsuit.
(Id HTf 12-13.)
When performing all these acts, Ms. Moler-Lewis was acting with the consent and
knowledge of her parents. (Id. ^f 12; Moler Aff. (R. 1169) f 8.) Moreover, it is
undisputed that Ms. Moler-Lewis is herself a client of Strassberg & Ensor. (Moler-Lewis
Aff. (R. 1174-1175) ^J 14.) Thus, all communications between Strassberg & Ensor and
Ms. Moler-Lewis, and all communications between the Molers and their daughter
relating to the substance of this litigation, are privileged.
The only circumstance in which this Court has held that the issue of "necessity" is
relevant to a claim of privilege is wholly inapposite to the present situation. In Hoffman
v. Conder, 712 P.2d 216 (Utah 1985), this Court addressed whether the presence of a
nurse during a conversation between Mark Hoffman and his counsel resulted in a waiver
of the attorney-client privilege. This Court concluded that, "[t]he proper standard is
whether the third person's presence is reasonably necessary under the circumstances."
IcL at 216-17. The Hoffman case did not address the situation presented here: whether a
designated representative of a party is included within the scope of the attorney-client
privilege.

3

Because the applicable rule (504(a)(4)) does not state that necessity is required,
and does not provide that the representative must constitute a legal "agent," those terms
should not be added by judicial decree. Members of the bar rely upon the plain language
of the rules when determining with whom they can, and cannot, share privileged
communications, and when advising their clients on these issues. Given the harm that
flows from being forced to disclose to an adverse party communications that the rule
states is protected from disclosure, the language of the rule must govern.
If this Court had intended to include in the definition of a "representative of a
client" a requirement that the representative's assistance be "reasonably necessary under
the circumstances," or that the "representative" actually be an agent—a legal term of art
with which the Court is undoubtedly familiar—such language would have been included
in the rule itself. In fact, the phrase "reasonably necessary" appears in Rule of Evidence
504(a)(6), which defines a communication as confidential if, "not intended to be
disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication." (Emphasis added.) Here, because Ms. MolerLewis was a representative of her parents, the communications between and among the
Molers, their counsel, and Ms. Moler-Lewis were by definition "in furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services to the client...", and thus there is no need to ask

4

whether Ms. Moler-Lewis' presence was "reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the communication." Indeed, the communications Defendants moved to compel included
"questions about whether Ms. Moler-Lewis assisted Mr. Moler and/or his counsel by
reviewing the Complaint, Interrogatories, and Mr. Moier's letters to the parties and others
... about the matters in dispute." (R. 981-982.) Such communications are related to "the
rendition of professional legal services," and Defendants have never argued a contrary
position.
Even if the Molers were required to demonstrate that Ms. Moler-Lewis'
participation in attorney-client communications was "reasonably necessary," the
undisputed record evidence establishes this was the case. Mr. Moler testified in his
affidavit that, prior to this lawsuit, the Molers "were never involved in civil litigation."
(Moler Aff. (R. 1169) ^ 4.) Because the Molers were unfamiliar with the civil process
and civil attorneys, they asked their daughter, a law school graduate who practiced law
for several years, to help identify and select counsel and to assist with this litigation. (Id.
^J 6.) Thus, even if the Molers were required to show "reasonable necessity," the
unrebutted testimony before the trial court demonstrates that Ms. Moler-Lewis'
participation in the litigation process was "reasonably necessary" under the
circumstances. Defendants proffered no evidence to the contrary.

5

Finally, ensuring the protection of the communications at issue in this case is
wholly consistent with the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege. As this Court
has recognized, "[t]he attorney-client privilege 'is intended to encourage candor between
attorney and client and promote the best possible representation of the client.'" Doe v.
Maret 1999 UT 74, % 7, 984 P.2d 980, quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick
Resources (USA), Inc., 901 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990). The communications between
and among the Molers, their daughter, and their counsel served but a single purpose: to
ensure that the Molers obtained the best possible representation. There is nothing sinister
or subversive about the Molers' desire to have their law degree-holding daughter look
over the shoulders of their counsel, particularly given the Molers' inexperience in civil
litigation.
The attorney-client privilege extends to Ms. Moler-Lewis, and Defendants should
be denied the opportunity to discover any communications between and among the
Molers, their counsel, and Ms. Moler-Lewis.

6

II.

BECAUSE NO PRIVILEGE EXISTED UNTIL MS. MOLER-LEWIS BEGAN
SPEAKING WITH ATTORNEYS ON HER PARENTS' BEHALF, MR. MOLER
DID NOT WAIVE THE PRIVILEGE BY TESTIFYING TO CONVERSATIONS
WITH HIS DAUGHTER PRECEDING THE RETENTION OF COUNSEL.
The trial court ruled that, even if Ms. Moler-Lewis were an "agent" of her parents,

any privilege was waived when Mr. Moler testified about conversations with Ms. MolerLewis that pre-dated her appointment as a representative.
Utah Rule of Evidence 507(a) provides that waiver of a privilege occurs only
where "the person or a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or
consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or
fails to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure." Utah R. Evid. 507(a)
(emphasis added). It is black letter law that testimony cannot constitute a waiver unless
the testimony concerns the subject matter of a privileged communication. Hence,
testimony to conversations that predate the existence of an attorney-client relationships
cannot possibly give rise to a waiver. The Molers' counsel did not object to questions
about communications between Mr. Moler and his daughter that pre-dated the creation of
the attorney-client relationship because no privilege existed to protect those
conversations. During the time period at issue (all times preceding Ms. Moler-Lewis5
December phone calls with prospective attorneys), Ms. Moler-Lewis was not acting as

7

her parents' lawyer and counsel had not been retained, so there was no attorney-client
relationship to which any privilege could have attached.
In fact, before December 2005, there were no attorney-client communications at
all, so Mr. Moler could not have disclosed "any significant part of the matter or
communication" that is protected by the privilege by testifying about conversations
before that date. Because Ms. Moler-Lewis was not acting as her parents' attorney or
representative before December 2005, Mr. Moler answered questions regarding
conversations with her parents predating December 2005 that were wholly unrelated to a
legal representation that had not even begun.
Specifically, the communications Defendants argued below gave rise to the waiver
were "conversations [between Mr. Moler and] Ms. Moler-Lewis about his position on the
Redfeather Homeowners Transition Committee, in light of his concerns about the
CC&Rs." (R. 988.) While it is unclear precisely what testimony Defendants are
referring to, and Defendants did not quote or attach any of Mr. Moler's testimony about
these matters to either their original memorandum or reply, conversations about Mr.
Moler's involvement in the Redfeather Homeowners' Association that predated any

2

In their memoranda below, Defendants did not identify the specific portion of the
deposition transcript to which they referred, nor did they attach any portion of the
transcript to support their waiver argument. This complete lack of evidence to support
Defendants' waiver argument is another reason why the trial court's ruling was in error
and should be reversed.
8

attorney-client relationship could not possibly give rise to a waiver. The Molers' counsel
objected to all questions concerning communications with Ms. Moler-Lewis after the
attorney-client relationship was formed, during which Ms. Moler-Lewis was acting as
representative or agent to the current litigation because, as discussed above, those
communications are protected as privileged under Rule 504. No waiver occurred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Molers respectfully request that this Court
REVERSE the trial court's order granting Defendants' motion to compel.
DATED this <$*day of May, 2007.
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HONORABLE TYRONE E MEDLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings)

5

PROCEEDINGS TELEPHONICALLY

6
7

THE COURT:

Okay.

Are both - are all three of you

still there rather?

8

MR. STRASSBERG:

Yes.

9

MR. HOBBS:

Yes.

10

THE COURT:

Four.

Okay.

We should be on the

11

record at this time, and this is case numbered 060902661.

12

And let's start by having counsel identify themselves for the

13

record starting with counsel for plaintiffs.

14

MR. STRASSBERG:

Evan Strassberg and Rick Ensor on

15

behalf of plaintiffs, and plaintiffs Dennis and Marilyn

16

Moler, are with us.

17

THE COURT:

Counsel for defendants.

Go ahead.

18

MR. HOBBS:

Lincoln Hobbs and Julie Ladel are here,

19

and Bart Kunz is here representing Sunrise/Frequent Homes and

20

Quint Heeder.

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you, counsel.

As you

22

know, this is the time that I set for ruling on the three

23

motions that I have currently pending before me, and I am

24

going to do that at this time.

25

initially say that - I guess I'm going to shift the

I'm going to go - and let me

1

1

responsibility to those parties who I've ruled in their favor

2

to draft the order consistent with the ruling I'm about to

3

announce unless you think you can collectively put together a

4

joint order that you can stipulate to.

5

for me.

6

prevailing party will prepare the appropriate order.

7

That would be better

But in the event you can't do that, then the

Let me go first to the defendant's motion for a

8

protective order.

Let me state first that I am going to deny

9

the Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order.

I'm doing

10

that because I am unable to find, based upon what's been

11

presented to me, that there has been a violation of Rule 4.2

1 2 - 1

think it's subsection (d). That rule expressly states

13

that when the represented person is an organization, an

14

individual is represented by counsel for the organization if

15

the individual is not separately represented with respect to

16

the subject matter of the representation.

17

I'm finding that Mr. Cannon elected to be represented by his

18

own counsel.

19

Mr. Strassberg and Mr. Ensor with Mr. Cannon through his

20

retained counsel was not in violation of Rule 4.2(d).

21

And in this case,

Therefore, the contact that occurred between

Let me also state that I've been invited by counsel

22

for the defendants to exercise this court's inherent powers

23

and authority to manage the practice of law before the court

24

and officers of the court in an effort to maintain the

25

integrity of trial proceedings, and under the facts and

1

circumstances that have been presented to me in the context

2

of this motion, I don't believe there are sufficient grounds

3

for me to exercise that discretion.

4

because of the express language in Rule 4.2(d).

5

that rule - it attempts to strike a balance between some

6

competing interests, and I would note certainly that the

7

balance that it attempts to strike I think is appropriate,

8

and to the extent it isn't clearly - it's a legislative or

9

rule making problem and not under the facts presented, a

I'm doing so primarily
In my view,

10

problem for this Court.

I do think that there may very well

11

be a set of circumstances out there where the court should

12

exercise it's inherent authority, but I can't find that this

13

case presents such a set of circumstances.

14

satisfied, however, that the motion - Defendant's Motion for

15

Protective Order is not frivolous, not meritless, and in

16

fact, while I think motions attempting to maintain that

17

opposing counsel has violated ethical rules should not be

18

made lightly, I don't find that this motion was, in fact,

19

made lightly, and I think it was appropriate to bring the

20

motion so this Court can have an opportunity to determine

21

whether or not in a given set of circumstances it is

22

appropriate for the court to exercise its inherent power.

23

this rule was - is in my view, is far from meritless.

24

the same time, I'm resolving it by relying on the express

25

language of the ruling and the circumstances which occurred

But I am

So

But at

1

here.

2

the Plaintiff's request, I'm not awarding attorney's fees as

3

it relates to that motion.

4

So I am denying that motion.

And inconsistent with

I'd like to go next now to the Plaintiff's Motion

5

to Compel. I've really struggled with this motion.

But in

6

the end, I've decided that I'm going to grant the Plaintiff's

7

Motion to Compel because I am satisfied that in light of

8

their pleadings, particularly their fraud claims, that this

9

request is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible

10

evidence which I think is the standard.

Additionally, I am

11

finding that I am not persuaded by the defendants' position

12

that this request seeks irrelevant documents or that it is

13

unduly burdensome.

14

request because clearly, it is broad enough that there is the

15

risk that it could involve documents which have nothing

16

involved with this particular case.

17

clear on its face.

18

to limit this request for discovery to only those files that

19

are known to have Red Feather estate documents in them.

20

was a - and I'll just call it a suggestion that the

21

plaintiffs made in their memoranda, and I am going to add

22

that limitation.

23

the fact that I was not persuaded, for example, that this

24

request is unduly burdensome in terms of just pure volume.

25

If I'd been persuaded of that, I would have been more likely,

I am concerned about this kind of a

I think that's pretty

But in granting this motion, I am going

That

But with that limitation and combined with

1

I think, to deny this motion to compel, because of its broad

2

nature on its face, but without being persuaded that its

3

unduly burdensome by way of just sheer volume, I'm not

4

persuaded that the defendants' position that it's unduly

5

burdensome because of some of the confidential nature of some

6

of the documents.

7

attenuated by the protective order that the parties have

8

stipulated to in this particular case.

9

grant the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel.

10

I'm going to find that that issue can be

So I am going to

Going next to the Defendants' Motion to Compel, let

11

me say that I am going to also grant the Defendants' Motion

12

to Compel.

13

includes granting of the enlargement of time of two hours to

14

continue the deposition.

15

because I'm of the opinion that the communications between

16

Mr. Moler and his daughter are not protected by the

17

attorney/client privilege.

18

legal advise based upon Mr. Moler's own admission in this

19

Court's opinion.

20

some deposition testimony, Mr. Moler acknowledged that she

21

was not his attorney.

22

Mr. Moler and his daughter are not protected by the

23

attorney/client privilege.

24
25

In granting that Motion to Compel, it also

And I'm granting this motion,

She is not aware, did not provide

He is not her client.

I think it was in

So in my view, the communications of

Additionally to the extent - even if I were to find
that there was such protection, I would, as suggested by the

1

defendants, find that Mr. Moler waived the privilege.

2

though, in my opinion it doesn't exist by his responses to

3

the questions in the deposition, itself.

Even

4

It has been suggested that these communications are

5

still protected because Ms. Moler-Lewis - and I think that is

6

her last name - is an agent.

7

not the case in that under this set of circumstances, because

8

I can't find the - that she was necessarily for the retention

9

of the legal advise, nor that she was essential to

And I'm going to find that is

10

plaintiff's representation, and in order for that to occur -

11

and let me back up a second.

12

the plaintiffs that the common interest doctrine applies in

13

this particular case and from my review of the case cite, I

14

would agree that the controlling authority requires that that

15

common interest be identical.

16

finding that they are not identical.

17

going to grant the Defendants' Motion to Compel.

It is suggested by counsel for

In this Court's opinion, I'm
So consequently, I am

Now, I think I'm correct about this next statement

18
19

and if I'm not even giving you a chance to address it, even

20

though I don't want to really entertain argument here this

21

morning.

22

fees, the plaintiffs in their memoranda, and their motion to

23

compel, I don't believe requested fees.

24

point - and keep in mind, I haven' t reviewed an affidavit

25

regarding attorneys' fees.

The Defendants' Motion t o Compel, I; think requested

But from my vantage

So I'm making an assumption here,
6

1

and my assumption may be incorrect.

2

face, at least, that I've granted each party's Motion to

3

Compel and it seems to me, that it is then unnecessary for me

4

to consider respective claims for attorneys' fees because in

5

essence, it's reasonably likely that they will cancel one

6

another.

7

either motion, but I do recognize - I make that statement

8

without the benefit of having reviewed affidavits in support.

9

But it appears on its

So consequently, I'm inclined not to award fees on

That's the matter on which I'm going to rule.

What

10

do you think the chances are you can submit to me one order

11

that will contain the substance of that determination?

12
13

MR. STRASSBERG:
that, Your Honor.

We'd be happy to attempt to do

I think we can do it.

14

MR. HOBBS:

One order with respect to all three?

15

THE COURT:

Yeah.

17

MR. HOBBS:

I don't.

18

THE COURT:

Okay. What if I gave you 10 days from

16

Do you see any problem about

that?

19

today to get that submitted to me.

If that fails, then the

20

prevailing parties will submit the proposed order consistent

21

with Rule 7(f). Okay?

22

MR. HOBBS:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

23

THE COURT:

Oh, one last item.

24

bringing to my attention.

25

mediation in this particular case.

My clerk is

I keep forgetting the issue of
Now keep in mind that

1

right at this moment, I don't have before me the case

2

management order which I'm assuming is in place in this

3

particular case,

4

don't have the time to get it right now, because I'm really

5

pressed - a very tight calendar this morning, but I wanted to

6

discuss with you - and I don't think we've had this

7

discussion yet.

8

cases a couple of months ago and that change has resulted in

9

me building into civil cases at the time the case management

I'm going to be honest with you.

I really

I've changed my process in handling civil

10

order is entered a requirement that the parties participate

11

in good faith in mediation in an attempt to resolve the case

12

and share the expenses of mediation.

13

mandatory requirement into this particular case, but I would

14

need your input as to when the most appropriate and most

15

effective time would be for building in such a requirement.

16

Who wishes to take a stab at that first in terms of when the

17

appropriate time would be?

18

MR. HOBBS:

I want to build that

Silence.

Judge, this is Lincoln Hobbs.

We have

19

about - oh, less, about two weeks more until discovery

20

cutoff.

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

22

MR. HOBBS:

At the conclusion of discovery cutoff,

23

I anticipate filing a motion to dismiss on behalf of Mr.

24

McCandless and C.W. Management.

25

would be appropriate for that to be filed and then have

I don't know whether it

1

mediation, or filed and heard, and then mediation because

2

obviously, the plaintiff's counsel are going to disagree with

3

my prospects on that, but I think my prospects with respect

4

to Mr. McCandless and C.W. Management are pretty good.

5

having been said, you know, 1 would realize upon filing a

6

motion, it may very well be tonight.

7

me that, from my perspective - and I jumped in because of the

8

silence - it would seem to me be after the discovery cutoff

9

and after filing that motion, but before it's ruled upon.

That

So I mean it seems to

10

And I guess we could leave it to the plaintiffs to decide if

11

they wanted to file a responsive pleading for the mediation

12

or not.

13

MR. STRASSBERG:

On behalf of the plaintiffs, Your

14

Honor.

That's fine with us if Mr. Hobbs intends to file that

15

motion.

I don't think we care too much one way or the other

16

with respect to the timing of filing a response.

17

would effectively address whatever issues he may be raising -

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. STRASSBERG:

20
21

Now, then -

through the mediation.
THE COURT:

I think it

- either in a brief or just orally

So The only preference I would have, and

22

it's - the only preference I would have is that at a minimum

23

that the motion be filed prior to mediation.

24

performs the mediation can at least have that in their - on

25

the radar screen as these discussions occur.

So whoever

Now, with that
9

1

stated, I'd like to set an order before a date this morning.

2

What would be the appropriate time to set that?

3

words, it could be a date that mediation would be required to

4

be complete on or before a certain day.

5

MR. HOBBS:

Jumping in again, Your Honor.

6

Lincoln Hobbs.

7

we could do it in December.

8

portion of December.

9

- with everything that carries with it.

10

15

My only thought on that would be - in theory

THE COURT:

I'm going to be gone for a good

Plus, December is December with all of
I would think pick

So if I were to say - just a second.

On or before Friday, January the 19th?

13
14

MR. STRASSBERG:

Fine with the plaintiffs, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

What will happen, is my clerk is

16

going to send you a minute entry and order with that

17

mediation date requirement in it.

18

MR. HOBBS:

19

MR. STRASSBERG:

20

THE COURT:

21

This is

sometime mid-January.

11
12

In other

Okay?

Okay.
Okay.

All right.

Hey, listen.

Thank you

very much.

22

MR. STRASSBERG:

Thank you, Your Honor.

23

MR. HOBBS:

Thank you.

24 J

THE COURT:

Okay, bye.

{Whereupon the hearing was concluded) ed)
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Dennis and
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
DENNIS MOLER, an individual, and
MARILYNN MOLER, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SUNRISE CAPITAL CORPORATION, LLC,
a Utah Limited Liability Corporation,
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McCANDLESS, an individual, FRANKLIN
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j ORDER ON
MOTIONS TO COMPEL AND
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER
Case No. 060902661
Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendants.
On November 6, 2006, the following motions came before the Court: (1) Defendants
Franklin Homes, Inc., Sunrise Capital LLC, Christopher McCandless and CW Management
Corporation's Motion for a Protective Order ("Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order"); (2)
Defendants' Joint Motion to Compel the Testimony of Dennis Moler and Wendy Moler-Lewis
and for an Enlargement of the Length of Time of the Deposition of Dennis Moler ("Defendants'
Motion to Compel"); and (3) Plaintiffs Dennis and Marilynn Moler's First Motion to Compel
("Plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel"). Having considered the memoranda submitted by counsel

and having heard oral argument, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for a Protective
Order and GRANTS both Defendants' Motion to Compel and Plaintiffs* First Motion to Compel.
With respect to Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order, the Courtfindsthat there was
no violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2. That Rule expressly states that when the
represented person is an organization, an individual is represented by counsel for the
organization if the individual is not separately represented with respect to the subject matter of
the communication. In this case, Mr. Cannon elected to be represented by his own counsel and,
therefore, the contact that occurred between Strassberg & Ensor and Mr. Cannon, through his
retained counsel, was not in violation of Rule 4.2(d). In addition, while the Court has been
invited to exercise its inherent power and authority to manage the practice of law before the
Court and the officers of the court, the Court finds insufficient grounds to exercise such
discretion in this case. The express language of Rule 4.2(d) attempts to strike a balance between
competing interests, which balance this Court believes is appropriate. To the extent Rule 4.2 is
not clearly expressed, it is a problem for the rule makers and not this Court. While there may be
a set of circumstances where the Court's inherent authority should be exercised, the Court finds
that this case does not present such a set of circumstances. Nevertheless, the Courtfindsthat
Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order was not frivolous, not meritless, and not made lightly,
and that it was appropriate for Defendants to provide the Court with an opportunity to decide
whether to exercise such inherent authority. The Court therefore denies Plaintiffs' requests for
attorney's fees and costs.
With respect to Defendants' Motion to Compel, the Court grants the motion, including an
enlargement of two hours to continue the deposition of Dennis Moler. The Courtfindsthat
communications between Mr. Moler and his daughter, Ms. Wendy Moler-Lewis, are not

protected by the attorney/client privilege. Ms. Moler-Lewis did not provide legal advice based
upon Mr. Moler's own admission during deposition testimony that he is not her client. The
Court would also find that, even if the attorney-client privilege did exist, Mr. Moler waived the
privilege in his deposition. The Court further finds that Ms. Moler-Lewis cannot be considered
Mr. Moler's agent for purposes of this litigation because the Court cannot find that she was
necessary for the retention of legal advice or essential to Mr, Moler's legal representation. It is
also suggested by Plaintiffs' counsel that the common interest doctrine applies in this particular
case. From the Court's review of the cases cited, the controlling authority requires that the
common interest must be identical In the Court's opinion, Ms. Moler-Lewis' interests and
Dennis Moler's interests are not identical in this case.
With respect to Plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel, the Court grants that Motion because
it is satisfied that in light of Plaintiffs' pleadings in this matter, particularly theirfraudclaims,
that this request is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, which is the relevant
standard. Additionally, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants' position that this request
seeks irrelevant documents or that this request is unduly burdensome. The Court is concerned
about the breadth of the requests and, in granting this Motion, limits the request to discovery of
only those files that are known to contain Redfeather Estates documents. The Court declines to
grant the costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing Plaintiffs1 First Motion to Compel.

SO ORDERED this P J ^ d a y of
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, 2006

Approved as to form;

Hiincoln W. H o 6 b s ( J
U
HOBBS & OLSON
Counsel for Defendants McCandless and CW Management Corp.

Craig V. Wentz
\
Barton Kunz
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
Counsel for Defendants Franklin Homes Inc., Quinn Heder, and Sunrise Capital, LLC

